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The aim of this study is to investigate debt sustainability in ten Central and 
Eastern European countries over 1997-2013. Following Burger (2012), we 
calculate the stabilized debt using the estimates of a fiscal reaction function for 
a balanced panel with fixed effects. Comparing the stabilized, the effective debt 
ratios and the historical averages, we can assess debt sustainability in short 
and in long run. We find that current debt ratio as of 2015 for Bulgaria and 
Romania is not sustainable. The debt dynamics of Bulgaria is stable whilst for 
Romania’s case the debt trajectory indicates unstable dynamics. As for 
historical averages of debt ratios, Bulgaria could encounter debt sustainability 
issues also in the long run.      
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1 Introduction 
Debt sustainability has become central after the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Since then, 
there has been observed an increased interest of international bodies such as the European 
Commission or the International Monetary Fund in developing policy frameworks and 
recommendations aiming at reducing high debt ratios and/or keeping the budget deficit under 
control.      
We acknowledged the existence of a rich body of research investigating sustainability of fiscal 
policy in general. We also found several papers indicating fiscal sustainability issues for many 
of the European Union (EU) countries even before the crisis (i.e. Afonso, 2000; Uctum and 
Wickens, 2000; Afonso and Rault, 2007). However, the literature studying the fiscal 
sustainability for Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) consists of a small 
number of studies. For instance, Redžepagić and Llorca (2007) used fiscal reaction function 
and Ordinary Least Squares to identify the determinants of fiscal sustainability in seven 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe over 1999-2006. They found a positive reaction of the 
primary balance to shocks on public debt in several CEECs, except Poland and Czech 
Republic. In addition, they indicated a relevant influence of the political and partisan cycle on 
fiscal sustainability only in Poland, but not in the rest of the countries examined. Stoian and 
Câmpeanu (2010) analyzed fiscal sustainability for ten Central and Eastern European 
countries estimating individual fiscal reaction functions for the period 2000-2008. The main 
findings of this study suggest that governments of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary 
and Lithuania were able to increase the primary surplus as response to shocks on public debt 
whilst for the cases of Latvia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia the response was opposite 
indicating difficulties in achieving fiscal sustainability. 
Therefore, the aim of our study is to examine debt related sustainability issues for ten CEECs. 
One main driver of our research was the particularities there have been observed for this 
group of countries with regard to their debt dynamics. Stoian and Iorgulescu (2016) 
documented that the former communist countries recorded lower debt ratios, primary deficit 
and negative flow costs in the sense of higher GDP growth rates than of the interest rates on 
public debt by comparison with the advanced economies in Europe for which the situation 
looked opposite. The authors suggested that CEECs might fall into the debt trap which implies 
the increase in the debt ratio as an effect of a negative flow cost. Negative flow cost is 
consistent with so called golden rule of fiscal policy (Escolano, 2010) because it keeps the 
debt ratio on a stable dynamics and also allows for primary deficit. However, this setting might 
lead to a significant growth of the debt ratio and as Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) suggested 
if the flow cost suddenly turns into positive because of deteriorating economic conditions, then 
the debt burden will largely increase. Making comparison between the debt ratio in 2013 and 
in 1997, we observed that, except Bulgaria, for which the debt ratio significantly decreased 
over this period, for the rest of Central and Eastern European countries the debt ratio 
considerably increased. We noted the largest increase for the Czech Republic and Latvia 
(3.7), for Slovenia (3.2), and for Lithuania and Romania (2.5). For rest of the countries under 
investigation, the results showed an increase of 1.7 for Slovakia, 1.4 for Estonia, 1.3 for 
Poland and 1.2 for Hungary. 
Considering this setup, the question which naturally arises is whether the current debt ratio of 
CEECs is sustainable. In order to provide a relevant answer to this research question, we 
employ the methodology suggested by Burger (2012), Burger et al. (2011), Burger and 
Marinkov (2012) and Fincke (2012b) which implies the calculation of a stabilized debt ratio 
using the coefficient estimates of a fiscal reaction function. We use a dataset consisting of 
annual data ranges from 1997 to 2013 for ten CEECs. The reminder of this paper is organized 
as follows. Section 2 presents in detail the methodology employed within this study. In Section 
3, we describe the dataset and report the results of our estimations. The last section 
comprises the concluding remarks.       
2 Theoretical background 
In order to conduct a profound analysis, some theoretical public finance background may be of 
avail.1 A good starting point is the budget identity of the government. Like any other economic 
agent it is required to balance expenditures and revenues. Public revenues mainly consist of 
taxes, T. As regards public expenditures, they are composed of primary spending for goods 
and services, G, and interest payments on already outstanding debt rBt-1. Eventually, if there is 
a funding gap, it is covered by issuing new bonds/ credit financing. Time is indicated by t.2 
Reorganization these connections, gives the common textbook notation:
 DEFt= ∆Bt = Bt – Bt-1=Gt-Tt+iBt-1      (1) 
With the deficit on the left, given by the change in debt and the primary deficit, G-T, and the 
administration’s interest payments iB on the right hand side of the equation. All variables are 
measured in nominal terms.  
Since economic growth is an essential feature of modern economies, it is appropriate to divide 
(1) by the GDP Y, with Yt = (1+ g)Yt-1 and g for the economic growth rate. Such a notation also 
allows for comparisons between different countries. It is common in the budget context to use 
ratios to GDP:3 
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with small variables notating ratios to GDP and pd expressing the primary deficit. As (2) 
shows, the interest rate and the growth rate as well as the initial indebtedness and the primary 
budget situation influence the size of the current debt ratio of an economy.  
Now if it is intended to stabilize the debt ratio at a certain level and kept it constant, as 
suggested by Stoian (2012), Stoian and Iorgulescu (2016), Buiter (2004), Burger (2012), 
Burger et al. (2011) for instance, this can be indicated by ܾ௧  ൌ ܾ௧ିଵ ൌ 	 തܾ ൌ const., giving 
equation (2) as: 
തܾ ൌ  ሺଵା௜ሻሺଵା௚ሻ തܾ ൅ ݌݀௦     (3) 
Here ݌݀௦ gives the required primary balance, which can be interpreted as the fiscal policy 
instrument in order to achieve the stabilized debt ratio  തܾ . Making use of the common 
approximation4  equation (3) can be stated as   
  െ	݌݀௦ ൌ  ሺ݅ െ ݃ሻതܾ      ⇔					 ݌ݏ௦ ൌ  ሺ݅ െ ݃ሻതܾ        (4) 
1 These theoretical issues have been pointed out in a similar way by Fincke (2012b).  
2 Cf. for instance Blanchard (2000, Chpt. 27.1) for the subsequent equations. The notation refers to discrete and 
real variables here. Similar approaches may also be found in or Neck and Sturm (2008, Chpt. 1.5) and Burger 
(2003) for instance. 
3 Cf. for instance Neck and Sturm (2008), Chpt. 1.5).  
4 See for instance Blanchard (2000, Chpt. 27.1, Appendix 2) for the calculations of the approximations. 
The latter part of (4) shows the primary surplus ݌ݏ௦, which is influenced by the interest rate -
growth rate – differential and the value of the stabilized debt ratio.   
For studying debt sustainability a formative approach has been introduced by Bohn (1998): the 
fiscal response mechanism. It analyses how the government reacts to changes in the public 
debt ratio with its primary balance relative to GDP. If it runs surpluses (or more general: 
enhances its balance) as the debt ratio rises, it indicates sustainable behavior.  That situation 
is for instance described in Greiner et al. (2007). It can be indicated as: 
 ݌ݏ௘ ൌ 	ߙ଴ ൅	ܿଵ	ܾ௧ିଵ     (5) 
with ߙ଴, ܿଵ	being constant parameters.  The reaction coefficient is  ܿଵ . It expresses the 
response of the primary surplus to GDP ratio to changes in the public debt to GDP ratio.   ߙ଴  
captures all other influences on the primary surplus ratio, see Greiner et al. (2005). Equation 
(5) addresses the empirical access to the approach. It reflects actual responses based on the 
country’s fiscal data, therefore it is labeled by e. Again, the central variables are the primary 
surplus and the debt ratio, indicating some similarities to the theoretical result in equation (4).  
Burger (2012), Burger et al. (2011), Burger and Marinkov (2012) and Fincke (2012b) elaborate 
further on the aspect and develop a link between (4) and (5). Burger and his coauthors 
suggest to calculate the stabilized debt ratio with regard to Bohn’s fiscal reaction function. If 
we assume that the primary surplus is the fiscal policy design variable and that it realizes 
values that stabilize the debt ratio so that ܾ௧ ൌ 	ܾ∗ ൌ ܿ݋݊ݏݐ. , this allows to write (see also 
Fincke (2012)): 
       ݌ݏ∗ ൌ 	ߙ଴ ൅ ܿଵܾ∗                                                             (6) 
with the stars indicating the stabilized values. Applying this idea to equation (4) makes it 
possible to show it in a similar way: 
   ݌ݏ∗ ൌ 	ߠܾ∗     (7) 
With ߠ referring to the interest rate – growth rate differential θ=i-g.  Following Burger by 
combining these two approaches stated in (6) and (7) , enables to determine the stabilized 
debt ratio according to: 
 ܾ∗ ൌ 	 ఈబఏି௖భ	.       (8) 
It shows that the stabilized debt ratio ܾ∗ is determined by the individual economy past fiscal 
behavior. It is expressed in terms of the coefficients estimated with the country’s fiscal data 
(ߙ଴, ܿଵ	coefficients). And it is shaped by the interest rate - growth rate differential θ.  Equation 
(8) shows how country-specific stabilized sustainable debt ratio could be calculated based on 
past fiscal behavior.  
3 Empirics 
We now apply Burgers’ concept based on a balanced data set to the CEECs to get some 
empirical results for the debt sustainability situation in these countries. In a first step, the data 
set is described, then the estimation set up and the results are presented.  
3.1 Data set description 
 
Our data set is made up of a few different sources due to data availability because we were 
seeking for a balanced data set. It consists of  data for the ten central and eastern new 
member states of the EU, i.e. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. It is a balanced panel with observations for the time 
period from 1997 to 2013.  
Our central interest is on the relationship between the public debt ratio and the primary 
balance ratio but in order to enhance the power we added several macro-economic control 
variables. We also know that fiscal policy does not react solely to shocks on public debt, but 
there are several other factors which can drive changes in the fiscal balance. The primary 
balance ratio (balance) comes from ECB statistical data warehouse. For Estonia and Czech 
Republic observations had to be taken from OECD economic outlook statistics and projections 
in order to get a balanced data set. The other main variable is the debt ratio (debt). It is 
considered as lagged debt, that is, the series run from 1997 to 2012. The observations stem 
from OECD economic outlook and ECB statistical data warehouse. Due to data availability for 
Lithuania the series had to be put together with observations from AMECO (2015) macro-
economic data base of the European Commission Directorate General for Economics and 
Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), ECB (2015) Statistical Data Warehouse and IMF (2014) World 
Economic Outlook.  
We include several control variables in our estimations. For instance, we used squared debt 
ratio (qdebt) in order to test for a potential non-linearity in the primary balance to debt 
relationship as in Bohn (2005) and to control for the reaction of fiscal policy to high public debt 
as an effect of the crisis. To measure the influence of the economic conditions, which may 
differ from country to country, the growth rate of real GDP per capita in constant US Dollar is 
included (rgrowthUS). GDP per capita comes from World Bank (2015) World development 
indicators. We controlled for the interactions between fiscal and monetary policy measured by 
inflation rate (inflation). Inflation is based on changes in the GDP deflator. Source for the 
deflator is IMF (2014) World Economic Outlook. We also included a variable in order to 
incorporate fiscal shocks (shock). It is calculated as coefficient of variation of the government 
spending of each year. The data on government spending stems from AMECO (2015). 
Following the seminal work of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) who suggested a significant 
relationship between budget institutions and fiscal outcomes and taking into account the 
strengthening of fiscal institutions over time across the countries in the European Union, we 
included a control variable for the (institutional) fiscal situation (frule) by the index variable for 
fiscal rules.  It comes from the European Commission (2016). We counted in the influence of 
the business cycle using the output gap (ogap) which comes from AMECO (2015) and is 
estimated based on potential GDP. As another macro variable the unemployment rate 
(unemployment) is incorporated in the fiscal reaction function to catch possible effects of 
enterprise restructuring process within the former communist countries on government 
transfers. It comes from AMECO (2015) database.  
Due to data availability we had to extend or replace certain observations in order to get a 
balanced data set. And for Latvia the primary balance for 2010 to 2012 is based on Central 
Statistical Bureau of Latvia (2015). The descriptive statistics of the data set are reported in 
Table 1: 
 
 
 
Table 1   Descriptive statistics 
Country Statistics balance debt qdebt rgrowthus ogap shock inflation unemployment frule 
Bulgaria 
average 1.67 40.53 2336.87 3.91 0.37 1.11 5.80 12.09 0.62 
median 2.02 31.58 1017.17 5.45 -0.01 1.36 4.66 12.10 1.08 
stdev 2.33 20.94 1801.91 3.38 1.81 5.65 2.41 3.90 1.02 
min -3.44 13.30 176.86 -3.67 -1.76 -8.95 -0.82 3.90 -1.01 
max 3.67 63.96 4091.14 9.41 4.51 6.49 8.79 18.20 2.07 
Czech 
Republic 
average -2.97 27.17 824.07 2.18 0.32 0.14 2.10 7.18 -0.24 
median -2.87 27.96 789.22 2.08 -0.16 0.15 1.91 7.24 -0.05 
stdev 1.79 7.82 480.49 2.98 2.51 4.90 1.66 1.08 0.40 
min -5.96 7.82 289.27 -5.53 -2.91 -5.84 -1.59 1.08 -1.01 
max 1.79 45.50 2070.25 6.38 5.79 14.33 3.95 8.30 0.40 
Estonia 
average -0.38 5.76 35.09 4.26 1.70 0.01 5.00 10.30 0.96 
median -0.23 5.69 32.33 6.59 1.73 -1.50 4.79 10.30 0.95 
stdev 1.48 1.41 18.80 6.57 5.84 8.52 2.51 3.32 0.08 
min -4.17 1.41 13.29 -15.75 -8.98 
-
10.42 0.43 3.32 0.08 
max 1.56 9.71 94.19 10.50 14.90 22.91 10.74 16.70 1.08 
Hungary 
average -0.83 65.20 4341.59 2.32 -0.11 -0.02 5.58 8.02 -0.24 
median -0.62 62.89 3959.84 2.89 -0.19 0.08 5.12 7.45 -0.51 
stdev 2.39 9.71 1315.07 2.90 2.54 2.39 2.51 2.03 0.65 
min -5.48 9.71 1315.07 -6.62 -4.49 -4.44 2.35 2.03 -0.79 
max 2.39 81.04 6568.13 4.90 4.36 4.52 8.12 11.20 0.95 
Latvia 
average -1.68 19.67 557.06 5.30 -0.24 0.34 5.40 12.66 0.16 
median -1.29 13.95 194.53 7.21 -0.53 -0.67 3.80 12.58 0.01 
stdev 2.37 13.03 717.87 7.31 5.89 8.53 5.09 3.66 0.61 
min -7.38 8.40 70.63 -18.14 
-
11.92 
-
10.06 -1.27 3.66 0.01 
max 2.37 46.77 2187.53 12.46 10.83 20.15 18.47 19.50 2.45 
Lithuania 
average -2.03 23.40 607.83 5.24 -0.46 -1.91 2.68 12.19 0.25 
median -1.26 22.36 499.93 6.29 -1.00 -4.94 2.39 12.90 0.04 
stdev 2.54 7.50 420.68 5.91 5.18 8.80 3.43 4.12 0.34 
min -8.06 7.50 236.88 -14.84 
-
10.25 
-
12.80 -3.49 4.12 -0.02 
max 2.54 39.93 1594.48 10.57 9.08 16.57 9.16 17.80 0.71 
Poland 
average -1.71 45.41 2093.37 3.72 -0.17 -0.37 3.49 13.33 1.39 
median -1.62 46.00 2131.91 3.64 0.24 -0.03 3.11 13.37 1.24 
stdev 1.47 5.43 500.59 1.65 2.40 2.61 1.54 4.46 0.35 
min -5.13 5.43 500.59 1.23 -4.39 -4.27 0.39 4.46 0.35 
max 1.47 54.80 3003.48 7.01 3.10 3.16 4.01 20.00 1.94 
Romania 
average -1.57 21.53 516.97 3.72 -0.29 0.37 17.35 7.08 -0.60 
median -0.97 21.56 483.26 4.27 -1.11 0.03 13.44 7.10 -0.59 
stdev 2.30 7.20 350.11 4.12 4.18 6.35 9.78 0.64 0.00 
min -7.37 7.20 150.60 -6.50 -4.79 -9.13 3.42 0.64 -0.60 
max 2.30 37.34 1394.20 9.79 7.38 11.02 21.03 8.30 0.00 
Slovakia 
average -2.86 39.49 1612.42 3.58 -0.09 -0.90 3.28 15.11 0.20 
median -2.46 40.83 1667.16 4.10 -1.01 -3.73 2.86 14.80 0.23 
stdev 2.39 7.14 569.01 3.45 3.22 9.09 2.46 2.92 0.93 
min -6.50 7.14 569.01 -5.57 -3.44 
-
14.64 -1.19 2.92 -1.01 
max 2.39 52.11 2715.87 10.12 7.22 9.09 5.68 18.80 2.47 
Slovenia 
average -1.98 29.37 940.70 1.99 0.17 0.36 3.78 6.82 0.08 
median -1.01 26.50 702.22 2.92 0.15 -1.86 3.54 6.60 0.36 
stdev 3.12 8.78 651.48 3.68 3.29 8.64 2.49 1.40 0.40 
min -12.02 8.78 468.68 -9.02 -4.78 -9.96 -1.07 1.40 -0.81 
max 3.12 53.39 2850.60 6.15 6.79 28.62 7.31 10.10 0.49 
 
 
 
3.2 Estimations 
 
Starting to apply Burgers’ concept introduced above to the CEECs required to first set up a 
regression to estimate the coefficients. To implement Bohn (1998)’s fiscal response 
mechanism our approach utilized a panel as the data series are rather short. We also 
employed the fixed effects model to capture the country-specific. The fixed effects model also 
helped us to make distinct estimates for the debt stabilizing ratio. Equation (9) presents the 
model design: 
 
                                               ݌ݏ௧௜ ൌ 	ߙ଴௜ ൅ ܿଵ	ܾ௧ିଵ௜ ൅	ࢆ௧௜ߜ ൅∈௧௜                                                     (9) 
 
For each individual economy i = 1 ….10, with control variables reflected in Z. 
We estimated equation (9) in several forms, firstly with all the control variables included, and 
then, removing the variables which were statistically not significant. Table 2 reports the results. 
Table 2   Estimates of fiscal reaction function 
Explanatory variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
debt 0.0779724* 0.078480* 0.080385* 0.085341* 0.057852*** 
qdebt -0.0244215 -0.025491 -0.026175 -0.033225  
rgrowthUS 0.0225522 0.020974    
ogap 0.0364843 0.032279  0.050473  
shock -0.2244680*** -0.227296*** -0.241706*** -0.231689*** -0.240735*** 
inflation 0.1024177*** 0.100083*** 0.102799*** 0.102518*** 0.098993*** 
unemployment 0.1312356 .  0.125263 .  0.102953* 0.140209* 0.102231*** 
frule 0.0008333     
factor (country)       
Bulgaria 0.0008333* -0.028480** -0.025452* -0.03060** -0.022137** 
Czech Republic -0.0605635*** -0.060287*** -0.058622*** -0.062232*** -0.054525*** 
Estonia -0.0291604** -0.027514** -0.024015*** -0.028959*** -0.022545*** 
Hungary -0.0650490*** -0.064477*** -0.063337*** -0.066421*** -0.059739*** 
Latvia -0.0534452*** -0.052383*** -0.048956*** -0.054156*** -0.045688*** 
Lithuania -0.0613449*** -0.060387*** -0.057469*** -0.062310*** -0.053580*** 
Poland -0.0711880*** -0.069120*** -0.066291*** -0.071900*** -0.061304*** 
Romania -0.0576738*** -0.057340*** -0.055867*** -0.059050*** -0.051660*** 
Slovakia -0.0815885*** -0.080447*** -0.077217*** -0.083519*** -0.072297*** 
Slovenia -0.0529946*** -0.052434*** -0.050987*** -0.054429*** -0.046643*** 
Residual standard error 0.01517 0.01513 0.0151 0.01509 0.01507 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7426 0.7442 0.7452 0.7455 0.7461 
F-statistic 26.64 28.38 32.19 30.29 34.58 
Significance codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 ‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ ‘; 1  
Based on Theil’ s Information Criterion of minimizing the standard errors, we selected model 
(5) for further estimations and discussions. We observed that fiscal policy reaction among the 
CEECs is positive, in the sense that a shock on public debt will lead to an increase in the 
primary balance by 0.05 percent of GDP. The delay of government response is of one year 
implying that the adjustment takes place one year after the shock occurs. One year delayed 
reaction function is consistent with fiscal sustainability for the reason that the interest 
payments on public debt occur later in time (Greiner, Koeller and Semmler, 2005). Thus, we 
can state that the conditions for running a sustainable fiscal policy within the CEECs are met. 
Additionally, we observed that the country-specific factors, α0i, are negative, suggesting that 
on average the primary balance of these countries was a deficit. These results are consistent 
with Stoian and Iorgulescu (2016) finding that Central and Eastern European countries mostly 
run primary deficits by comparison with the advanced economies in the European Union. They 
are also in accordance with the average values for the primary balance reported in Table 1. 
The only exception was Bulgaria, which introduced on July1, 1997 the currency board in order 
to stabilize the national economy. As an effect, large primary surplus were generated in order 
to reduce the public debt which in 1996 recorded the highest level of 111.8 percent of GDP 
(Roussenova, 2002). Fiscal shocks have a negative effect on primary balance and lead to an 
adjustment of 0.22 percent of GDP. The correlation between inflation rate and primary balance 
is a positive one and significant and suggests tight fiscal policy in relationship with the 
monetary policy. There are papers which documented the continuous concern of the 
governments in Central and Eastern Europe for price stability (Svejnar, 2006; Nath and 
Tochkov, 2010). They introduced restrictive fiscal and monetary policies along with wage 
control, currency devaluation and in some cases fixed exchange rates as to control for the 
galloping inflation in the early period of transition. Joining the European Union and the 
prospect of accession to the Eurozone also brought the responsibility of achieving low inflation 
rates in absolute terms, but also relative to the benchmark established by the Maastricht 
Treaty. Keeping the budget balance under control and avoiding large deficits represent key 
issues of completing macroeconomic objectives. The positive and significant relationship 
between unemployment and primary balance can reveal highly discretionary fiscal policy 
which did not allow for unemployment compensations to lead to large budget deficits although 
unemployment still represents a major problem in the post-communist countries (Münich and 
Svejnar, 2007). We found no significant impact of the squared debt, which suggests the 
existence of a linear relationship between government debt and primary balance across the 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Also, the GDP per capita growth rate and the fiscal 
index have no relevant impact on the primary balance. 
Using the estimates of coefficients α0i and c1 for model (5), we calculate the stabilized debt, b* 
as described in equation (8). We used the implicit interest rate on public debt (i) and the GDP 
growth rate (g) over 1998-2013 from Ameco (2016) in order to compute the differential, θ. The 
results are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3   Stabilized debt ratio vs. current debt ratio 
Country θ =(i-g) c1 α0 ܾ
∗ ൌ ∝଴ߠ െ ܿଵ b2015 gap=(b2015-b*) 
Bulgaria -0.04738 0.0579 -0.0221 21.0 26.7 5.7 
Czech 
Republic -0.00047 0.0579 -0.0545 93.4 41.1 -52.3 
Estonia -0.05272 0.0579 -0.0225 20.3 9.7 -10.6 
Hungary -0.00169 0.0579 -0.0597 100.2 75.3 -24.9 
Latvia -0.04363 0.0579 -0.0457 45.0 36.4 -8.6 
Lithuania -0.0137 0.0579 -0.0536 74.9 42.7 -32.2 
Poland -0.00904 0.0579 -0.0613 91.6 51.3 -40.3 
Romania -0.0936 0.0579 -0.0517 34.1 38.4 4.3 
Slovenia 0.007959 0.0579 -0.0466 93.3 83.2 -10.1 
Slovakia -0.01277 0.0579 -0.0723 102.3 52.9 -49.4 
 
We can compare the current debt ratio as of 2015 with the stabilized debt ratio in order to 
detect debt sustainability issues on short term. We found positive gaps only for Bulgaria and 
Romania which suggest debt sustainability issues. For the rest of countries, the results show 
negative gaps which indicate sustainable debt. If we analyze the evolution of debt ratio over 
the last 20 year, including the forecasts for 2016 and 2017 as provided by Ameco (2016) and 
consider a linear trend, we can establish unstable trajectories (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1   Debt dynamics, stabilized and average debt ratio   
Figure 1   Debt dynamics, stabilized and average debt ratio 
For Bulgaria, the stabilized debt ratio corresponds to the debt ratio in year 2005. Bulgaria has 
continuously decreased the debt ratio since 1997 and the debt dynamics over the past 2 years 
has been a stable one.  Analyzing the historical average of debt ratio, we can observe that the 
stabilized ratio is below the average. If we consider the historical average as a benchmark for 
the long term debt sustainability, we can state that Bulgaria could confront some debt 
sustainability issues in the future.  Latvia exceeded the stabilized debt ratio by almost 5 
percent of GDP in 2010 and then reduced the debt ratio close to the stabilized ratio in 2011. 
However, the debt dynamics indicate an unstable path over the last 20 years. The average 
debt ratio is below the stabilized one which might indicate debt sustainability in the future. As 
for Romania, the stabilized debt ratio roughly corresponds to the debt ratio in years 2013 and 
2015. The linear trend suggests an unstable debt dynamics and in between 2013 and 2015 
the effective debt ratio was close or exceeded the stabilized ratio. These results indicate 
current debt sustainability issues although the historical average suggests debt sustainability 
in the long run. There is a group of countries consisting of the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia for which we calculated stabilized debt ratios close to 100 
percent of GDP. Examining the historical data for debt ratio and also the average, we found no 
evidence of large debt ratios within this group of countries, except for Hungary for which the 
descriptive statistics indicate the greatest average, to suggest such high stabilized debt ratio. 
These results might indicate some limits of the model employed. We must note that in the 
case of negative differential between the implicit interest rate on public debt and the GDP 
growth rate, θ, and of a positive response of government, c1, the country specific coefficients 
α0i, should have been negative in order to calculate a relevant stabilized debt ratio. When θ 
approaches to zero and becomes positive and exceeds the response coefficient, c1, the 
country specific coefficients should be positive in order to calculate a non-distorted stabilized 
debt ratio. This is consistent with achieving primary surplus in order to stabilize the public debt. 
For these countries, the difference (θ- c1) is lower and closes to zero suggesting that the 
interest rate roughly equals the GDP growth rate. Around these settings, the results might be 
distorted. For Estonia and Lithuania, the current debt ratio is sustainable, the linear trend 
indicates a stable debt dynamics over the past twenty years and the historical average also 
suggest debt sustainability in the long run.                  
 
4 Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to examine debt sustainability for ten Central and Eastern European 
Countries. The reasons which drove our research were the limited number of papers with this 
regard and some debt dynamics particularities which have been observed for this group of 
countries. For this purpose, we employed a methodology consisting in calculating the 
stabilized debt ratio based on estimates of a fiscal reaction function. The dataset used ranged 
a period from 1997-2013. Comparing the stabilized debt ratio with the current debt ratio as of 
2015, we found debt sustainability issues in the sort run for Bulgaria and Romania. For rest of 
the countries, the results suggest debt sustainability. Analyzing the linear trend of the debt 
ratios over the past 20 years from 1997 to 2017, we found unstable debt dynamics for 
Romania and also for Latvia. The comparison between the stabilized debt ratio and the 
historical average indicate debt sustainability in the long run for all of the countries, excepting 
Bulgaria. We also found distorted results for five countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) which indicated some limits of the model employed. 
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